Experimentalism strives to appropriate the best of the old and allows for the unique aspect of the new; it "recognizes the fluid and complex character of the moral process;" it supplies methods of analysis, formation of hypo-
theses, trials of them in practice; it holds that the criterion of the value of the ethical act is not determined by any pronouncement of an antecedent authority; rather, the value of it-and its value is its ethical goodness-is determined by the consequences of it; finally, experimentalism "repudiates any notion of finality in the process of moral discovery and points to growth as both the present immanent meaning and the future consummation of the moral life."
Somewhat optimistically, one would say, the author follows this description of experimentalism with the "thesis of this paper that a reconciliation (between experimentalism and Christian ethics) can and should be made." It is not necessary to pursue in detail how the author proceeds to this reconciliation; obviously the method is an old one-the use of an excised Gospel record interpreted in as near a fashion as is possible to make Gospel ethics similar to the experimentalist views; what is left in the way of contrast is taken care of by the alleged spirit of Christian ethics: "it is essentially a growing thing."
The sincere search and the failing path to the goal are to be seen also in the recent article of E. B. Storr, "The Final Authority in Conduct," [The Congregational Quarterly, 18 (July 1940) 3, 283-289] . Herein the author, omitting to treat the natural law, finds no hope of final authority in the laws of men. Biblical criticism has destroyed the ultimate authority of Protestantism, and many who have surrendered the idea of the infallible book "have fallen back on the idea of an infallible Person. Jesus, they claim, is the final and absolute moral authority." But "which Jesus? For there are two distinct figures in the Gospels-that of the Synoptics and that of John. . . . Again, much of His teaching is in parabolic form, and we have not always the key to unlock its meaning. Further, what measure of importance is to be attached to the apocalyptic element in His teaching, and how much truth is there in the idea of an Interimsethik-an ethic meant only for special conditions and not applicable to our ordinary life?" Then, there is the repeated refusal of Christ "to be a lawgiver," and "there is no reference in the Gospels to many difficult ethical questions . . . the drink problem . . . war . . . slavery . . . certain sex problems. ..." "We conclude, then, that neither State nor Church, neither Book nor Man, gives what we are in search of-a final and absolute moral authority." Man is, therefore, left only with conscience, and the guide of this is the past, the community, and the expert; of the three "Jesus represents the authority of The Expert," while the Church represents the authority of the community.
These notices prove how important is the publication of such a book as Nature and Functions of Authority, by Doctor Yves Simon, (Marquette University Press, 1940, pp. 78) . It would be well if the world outside the Church delved into such exposes of theses and thoughts which are familiar enough to Catholic scholars, but which are of another world for those who have had no systematic training in philosophy before engaging upon the history and content of Christian origins. In Simon's Aquinas Lecture for 1940 there are not new viewpoints for us, but there is an excellent presentation of two points, the question of the relations between authority and individual liberty and the treatment of the liberalistic view that authority is not something natural and instinctive in man, but a substitutional device excogitated by man for the protection of the incapable.
With acceptable philosophical bases the adverse critics would be in a far better position to understand the positive revealed Law of Christ and of His Kingdom, the Church. It is heartening to note that occasionally some outside the Church have weighed the theory of an Interimsethik and found it wanting in some respects. The article of David R. Cochran, "The Relation between Ethics and Eschatology in the Ante-Nicene Fathers," [Anglican Theological Review, 22 (Oct. 1940) 4, 309-325] notes a number of points which are valuable. The author points out that the theory of the Interimsethik is still prevalent, and especially "explains away" very frequently the renunciatory parts of Christ's ethics. Now the opinion that the end would come soon was an opinion which was still persisting in certain writers into the fourth century (when it may be quoted in Eusebius); this opinion was not found in the Alexandrian writers, because in their tradition the coming of Christ was understood as an individual affair in the life of each man as well as an end-phenomenon; the emphasis on this second Advent of Christ tended to exclude an emphasis on the third or final Advent.
Historical investigation according to Cochran fails singularly to discover that the ethical views of the early Christian writers were influenced by the expectation which they had. The author examines two principal points in which the ethical viewpoint ftiight be expected to be influenced, first, the whole question of marriage, celibacy, and purity. In dealing with these topics the motives and arguments which are put forth for renunciation are not that the world is not to last; the motives are sacrificial, along with an insistence that the state of marriage is only for the procreation of children. Tertullian and Eusebius may be cited as the only ones who urge as a motive the eschatological expectation. Secondly, the Christian attitude toward the State and worldly institutions "moved on quite a different plane from eschatological hope."
The author concludes that with this absence of the eschatological motive it ought to be admitted historically that the other-wordly view of early Christianity, first, is not necessarily connected with the Advent, and secondly. that it has its obvious roots for its renunciations in the Christian dualism of the flesh and the spirit; the flesh is to be conquered by renunciation of the desires of the body and of the goods 6f the world. In conclusion, the author discusses an objection that the publicized motives (all that we have in the historical documents) may be rationalized arguments put forth for public consumption for the pagans; that, therefore, the real motives (eschatological) were silenced. There is not proof of such rationalizations; the tenor of the arguments is discoverable in documents which were for Christian reading as well as in those which were offered to the pagan public.
The above article assumes rightly that the views of the early Christians concerning the flesh are those which are ordinarily associated with Christianity. It is on this very point that issue has been taken recently in the essay, "The Anthropology of Saint Paul," by Robert M. Grant [Anglican Theological Review, 22 (July, 1940) 3, 199-203]. Students of Saint Paul will be surprised at the amazing (and erroneous) conclusions reached here concerning the Apostle's hyper-Puritanical ethos, his emphasis on woman as inferior, on marriage as contemptible, his tabu of women's hair, his fantastic picture in Romans I of the Greco-Roman world. The writer finds all this in sharp contrast to the healthful spirit of Jesus. But apparently the Apostle has scored against the Master! For, his attitude toward flesh has had "unfortunate effects on the church, especially in continental Protestatism, down to the present day."
A juster view of Saint Paul will be found in the article, which is in contrast to that of Grant, in "The Fifth Gospel: The Gospel according to Saint Paul," by Otto W. Heick, [Lutheran Church Quarterly, 13 (July 1940) 3, 233-244]. The value of the article is in the immense array of Pauline passages (some cited for the orthodox Lutheran positions) which show that the doctrine of the Apostle is that of the Master. These lead, in the author's citation at the end, to the thought so finely phrased by Feine that were men without the Gospels, and had the Pauline letters, the faith of the Christian Church would have been the same.
Interestingly enough the saying of Christ that "the disciple is not above the master," has been strikingly illustrated also in respect of views upon eschatological ethics in the article of Ray C. Petry, "Medieval Eschatology and Saint Francis of Assissi," [Church History, 9, March 1940) l,H-69]. The author describes the historical scene in Saint Francis' century as one of expectation of the end; here Petry's presentation impresses one as colored by the thesis of the writer. Likewise, while Francis was admittedly stirred by the "moving panorama of sinful humanity and the trial and persecution of Christ's faithful," it seems exaggeration to state that he was "fascinated by the approaching end and by the tyrannical power of the Evil One/* or that his spirit of renunciation drew principally from the thought of the Last Day.
But this notice of Petry's article is less concerned with the historical assertions about Saint Francis (for whose story there are better authorities than those cited in the notes-I refer especially to Coulton) than with the conclusion of the essay where the Poverello suffers the same fate as Christ. "Francis was a medieval man. His patterns of thought were those of his time. The prevailing note of his age was necessary preparation for the inevitable Great Day. His contribution must be appreciated, if at all, in relation to his part in that eschatological program. His poverty idealism itself cannot be viewed and evaluated as an attempt at a modern type of social reconstruction. His renunciation must be interpreted as a means to a unique heraldy of God's Kingdom and to the redemptive service of men in the Last Days."
THE CHURCH
PERPETUITY OF THE CHURCH. Since man is instinctively religious, religion will not die, though particular forms of religious expression and confession will die. This is the contention of James Bissett Pratt in Why Religions Die. (Univ. Cal. Press, 1940), who applies the three aspects of all instincts (with McDougall) to the religious instinct, namely, the perceptual, the emotional and the volitional, and finds that man's emotional reaction to religion will always obtain. Following an historical analysis why certain ancient forms of religion (Babylonian, Egyptian, etc.) died, the author offers to a Christianity which is threatened with extinction the antidote of modernism. "But, one may ask, can the essential part of the Christian tradition be preserved and, at the same time, thought be left free and faith be kept elastic? I think it can . . . through a constantly fresh and ever spiritual reinterpretation of the essential Christian symbols." Prof. Pratt does not advert in the essay to the fact that Christianity is founded on revelation and that it has in its pure form a promise of perpetuity.
PROPAGATION OF THE FAITH. Under the title Tons les fiddles pour tons les infideles Adolphe Roy has written an interesting booklet on the Association for the Propagation of the Faith (Montreal, 1940, 133 pp.)« There is a history of the movement since its origins in 1822, an account of the sums collected and distributed, and the official documents and rules which govern the Association.
GOD THE CREATOR OF NATURE
A THEOLOGY OF WOMAN. In The Thomist [2 (Oct. 1940), 4,459-518] Father B. M. Lavaud, O.P., writes fifty valuable pages on the topic "Toward a Theology of Woman." The best preparation for the reading of this article is a prior essay of the same author, "L'idee divine du mariage," which appeared in the Etudes Carmelitaines [23 (Apr. 1938) 1, 165-203] , in which after a summary and discussion of the scriptural texts which have to do with marriage, the author discussed the ends of the sacrament as put forth in the early Fathers. Here was found a tendency to consider the acts of marriage in too close connection with ascetical views and with relations to sin, both original and actual. In the modern views concerning the purposes of marriage there is a distinct tendency to accentuate, and this need not be done unduly, the purposes of the common life and their effect on the development of the personality of both partners. This new emphasis increases the consideration of woman as a partner of the contract, and thus one feature of a more adequate "theology of woman" is brought to our attention.
The article in the October (1940) Tbomist again calls attention to the fact that "certain age-old defects in the presentation of the doctrine of marriage explain the imperfections and omissions, and even the lack of a theology of woman," There is "neither Jew nor Greek," said Saint Paul, (Gal. 3, 28) and this phrase has been well emphasized, of old and lately, in our writings on the Mystical Body. But no such emphasis has been given to the phrase which is also written in the same verse, "neither male nor female." In the patristic age the influence of the Greco-Latin philosophy and literature, the Roman law and also the laws of uncivilized peoples, the heritage of what had come from the defective rabbinical exegesis, but above all the ascetical outlook of the Church concerning celibacy and purity-all these unduly affected the theologians of the early centuries, and biased their minds with prejudices against woman. The patristic thought in this respect became the heritage of the medieval schoolmen.
To all this current in theology Father Lavaud opposes the scriptural texts which have to do with woman. In the texts concerning the creation of Adam and Eve there is nothing to support the view of Saints Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Ambrose that sex was not decreed by God until after the prevision of the fall; neither can it be sustained that procreation would have been different in the state of innocence. Saint Augustine, though more temperate, fails to draw out the implications of the idea that woman is the help mate and partner of man, and Aquinas and the schoolmen follow Augus-* tine. In the creation of Eve from the side of Adam both Augustine and Aquinas note the symbol of the conjuncth socialis, but woman becomes, in the phrase of Bossuet, a "sort of diminutive." It is exaggerted, however, to claim that the Fathers or the schoolmen ever denied that woman has a spiritual and immortal soul.
In the story of the temptation and fall the fact that woman is the first to be tempted led the schoolmen to expatite on the natural weakness of woman, on her intellectual and moral inferiority, and even on her lesser possession of supernatural grace. Saint Hugo, Lombard, Saint Thomas may be cited for these views which in their fullest expression may be found in Saint Bonaventure on the 21st Distinction of the Second Book of the Sentences. The development originated in the order of the temptation in the story of Genesis, and not much attention was paid, at least for determining a theology of woman, to the fact that the order of temptation is to be reversed in the order of Redemption through the Fiat of the Virgin and the cross of Christ.
In God, to whom all should tend, as well as the unity of means to secure that end." With this basis of unity, its nature is put forth as something different from the regimented international uniformity of the Socialists and the Com-munists or the "atomized" unity into which industrial Capitalism has driven the modern proletariat. It is organic unity. In touching on the necessary authority which must be in the state, the Pope "places an unerring finger on the basic weakness of a so-called authoritarian State which defeats the very purpose of authority by renouncing, through a denial of the spiritual nature of man, the only basis of authority, a free and intelligent recognition and consent." The principles laid down are applied in the Encyclical to private enterprise, the family, education, and international relations.
GOD THE AUTHOR OF SUPERNATURE ORIGINAL SIN. IS WORLD MISERY A PROOF?
As in other scenes and times the miseries of the human situation and world history have led thinking men to conjecture some cataclysmic experience at the very origins of the race, so too in these appalling days through which the world is living. There are three well-known passages on this topic in Catholic writings, and that of Newman comes most easily to mind. Shortly after the opening of the Sth. chapter of the Apologia pro vita sua, the peerless paragraph occurs, which, since it says better what is noted in the modern authors whom we are to quote, is here repeated. NEWMAN. "To consider the world in its length and breadth, its various history, the many races of man, their starts, their fortunes, their mutual alienation, their conflicts; and then their ways, habits, governments, forms of worship; their enterprises, their aimless courses, their random achievements and acquirements, the impotent conclusion of long-standing facts, the tokens so faint and broken of a superintending design, the blind evolution of what turn out to be great powers of truths, the progress of things, as if from unreasoning elements, not toward final causes, the greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his short duration, the curtain hung over his futurity, the disappointments of life, the defeat of good, the success of evil, physical pain, mental anguish, the prevalence and intensity of sin, the pervading idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irreligion, that condition of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described in the Apostle's words, "having no hope and without God in the world,"-all this is a vision to dizzy and appal; and inflicts upon the mind the sense of a profound mystery, which is absolutely beyond human solution.
"What shall be said to this heart-piercing, reason-bewildering fact? I can only answer, that either there is no Creator, or this living society of men is in a true sense discarded from His presence. . . . And so I argue about the world: // there is a God, since there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence; and It is claimed for Christianity that it sets forth an ideal moral code and an absolute moral standard. This is so high as to be practically unattainable save by the grace of God and the power of His Holy Spirit. But the flesh wars against the Spirit. There is in man a kind of damnosa hereditas, a proneness to evil and wrongdoing which must be overcome before he can produce those fruits of the spirit which are the sign of his Christian standing." Yet the author is not willing to accede to either one of two forms of concept of original sin. "What is needed today is not a return to Thomism or to Calvinism, but rather to the mind of Christ."
The "new deflationary religious mood" is taken up for discussion in the Rauschenbusch Lectures of 1939 by F. Ernest Johnson and reprinted in the book The Social Gospel Re-examined (Harper, 1940, pp. 261, $2.00). In Chapter III, "How 'Fallen* is Human Nature?" the author puts the question "whether or not the nature of man is so weighted with evil-oriented away from God-that only a succession of miraculous happenings, called accessions of grace, can regenerate him." Struck by the "elemental fact of human experience" that man seeks God, and thinking that the tendency to refer this religious experience to a source outside man is due to a need for "symbols," the author is able to retain some of the optimism which is in the "assurance that indefinite perfectibility is not excluded as we address ourselves to the modification of human nature."
The author admits that "the net result of consulting biology and the forms of psychology that are in high degree biologically oriented is that man has a permanent inheritance that makes him capable of the most bestial conduct. There is no known way to eradicate that sinister aspect of human nature from man's animal inheritance. The potentiality of evil remains. The orthodox theologians score." But one may turn from this view to the hope held out by the cultural anthropologists; it is found that there are "culture patterns that select among native capacities those that shall be given the right of way. The facts about human imperfection must lead to insistence on the idea of the Kingdom;" in them "liberal social Christianity finds a compulsion toward what it calls 'Kingdom building.' " Man is, in contrast to the lower orders, self-transcending, and society by its very nature, affords the means of implementing the highest insights of its more sensitive souls. Perhaps the same observation should be made of those who profess to accept the doctrine" (p. 108). Professor Lewis' book has many other interesting features, some of which are discussed in a review of this somewhat exceptional work, to appear in the next issue.
Theologians will not find expected orthodoxy in all the views of Edwin
The Catholic theologian may rightly rejoice that the doctrine of original sin is being considered again without the exuberant and scornful rejections which were the fruit of the heyday of optimistic evolution. But it is to be noticed that this "empirical" manner of reconsidering the fault of the first man has a definite tendency to make man's proneness to evil the essence of the sin. Actual sin is admitted to be prevalent, a tendency to it is discoverable even in the best men; hence the moderns are inclined to admit what they call original sin; but this is not the original sin which is derived through considerations of a re-admitted Genesis and through an acceptance of the implications of an inspired passage in Romans. Obviously, sources outside revelation can at most confirm what is in them, and the modern world has discredited revelation; modern writers, therefore, will give little real help to their readers either in respect of a plenary faith or of practical guidance of life.
Our theological manuals have contained for many years adequate answers to the difficulties of the last century and this against the doctrine of original sin. These solutions in the text-books are sometimes necessarily summary and in Latin; for an excellent treatment of the two main difficulties (the voluntariness of the sin is thought individual and injustice is charged to God) one will go far before finding a better essay than that written fifteen years ago by Doctor Joseph Becker, "Zur Theodicee der Erbsunde," in the 1926 Unzer Quartahchrift.
Possibly the only theological point which has been proposed anew in recent years is that of A. Van The denial that Faith and Hope remain in the cases cited is temerarious. Yet some theologians have argued that, since the virtues flow from Grace physically or morally, it is possible to conceive that only the natural capacity to assent and to trust remains after mortal sin, and that this, activated by actual Grace, is the agent in the process of justification. Moreover, they think that there is a special difficulty in the case of Hope, since, according to many, Hope is a concupiscential love of God.
The argument is not conclusive; it may be answered by pointing out that, although the virtues flow from Grace, there is no essential and necessary connection between the two, at least, between Grace and Faith and Hope. A better answer seems to lie in appealing to the extraordinary power of God, who sustains these virtues, as, similarly, the accidents of bread and wine are sustained after the consecration. Since Faith and Charity are united to the two potencies of the soul, Mersch turns to a consideration of the soul itself as a permanent living entity. Certainly the vital activity of the first instance is due to Sanctifying Grace itself; but with the permanance of vital activity there is a faculty which is intimately concerned, the memory. By the memory we preserve the supernatural promises which have been given us; by it, the persistence of our psychological life is maintained; through it we are aware of the continuity of our person and the totality of ourselves; by it we are enabled perpetually to enrich our souls out of the past; even more, through memory we are able to disjoin ourselves from the present and the ephemeral and thus in a sense to live above time; and, finally, by memory we are able to possess in some measure the future. All these features which follow considerations of the functions and effects of memory and have to do in some way or another with self-construction and totality fit in with the functions and nature of the supernatural virtue of Hope. Hence, Hope belongs to the will, but under the aspect of concupiscential love in a way which has to do with our whole selves and beings as permanent, capable, and destined units. Faith, therefore, and the mind as a single faculty reach truth, God Triune; Charity and the will as a single faculty reach good, God Triune; Hope and the will as one faculty reach out to our total life of eternity, God Triune.
THE VIRTUES AND THE HUMAN FACULTIES, Father McCarthy
THE For the analogy is based on the fact that mind is directive of action, and that an objective order of finality postulates a directive mind. In general, Hope, as other virtues, has a certainty of tendency towards its object; specifically, it has this out of the Divine ordination. Hence, one may say that the certainty of Hope is derived from that of Faith insofar as the motion of the appetite is directed by the cognitional faculty; yet the certainty of Faith is not a part of the certainty of Hope, thus derived. For the basis of Hope rests on the Divine ordination which comprises the mercy, power and salvific will of God. More precisely the fundament of Hope is the liberalitas divina ordinans nos in finem. This is revealed and it is accepted as certain revelation by Faith; but for the single person to have Hope it is necessary to know that this Divine liberality is 'extended to him. Hence, the certainty of Hope is individual and particular; that of Faith, general. The certainty of Hope is not a certain knowledge of one's predestination to glory; it is truly present as a supernatural virtue in the nonpredestined, and it is not vain in their case, since the Divine liberality is prompt to aid all. , 1904, viii, 530) . The writer has taken the text out of theological language, and in so successful a fashion as to convince all that he has read and digested the Summa over long and studious years. This volume, together with the others of the series, is an excellent book to put in {he hands of seminarians; it will be an excellent introduction to the Summa for them. Again, it is a valuable book for the priest and will be found to have innumerable suggestions which will help sermon-composition and also countless bits of practical wisdom for the guidance of souls. Father Farrell promises that during this year he will complete his volume on the first part of the Summa, and, after a decent interval, the volume on the third part. The author, too modestly, calls this four-volume work "a layman's Summa;" it is that, but priests, pastors and professors, and seminarians will do well to familiarize themselves with Father Farrell's book. In a work of the kind, theological discussion of disputed points of Aquinas' text is not to be expected; the writer follows the thought of the Dominican school without retarding his pages by calling attention to the divergent interpretations which theologians of other schools have offered.
THE VIRTUES AND PRACTICE. Practical ascetical considerations on Grace and the Virtues are to be found in a book by the Reverend James F. Carroll, C.S.Sp., God, the Holy Ghost, (Kenedy, 1940, vi, 316) . The merit of this book is an emphasis on the activity of the Holy Ghost in the Gifts, the Beatitudes and the Fruits. The writer does not offer new theological considerations but he is able to urge very effectively the practical applications which originate in meditation upon the theology of Grace and the Virtues.
Monsignor Elias Miniatis was the author of Petra Scandali, a book which has long been the store-house of modern Greek (and of some Protestant) writers against the primacy of the Roman See. His fame among his own followers is accounted for by this book; he is reprobated among them for the "Latinism" of his profession of the Immaculate Conception, a doctrine which he spread in his writings and sermons. To such an extent has this rejection of Elias gone that editions of his works have appeared with the passages on the Immaculate Conception omitted; thereupon the notion has been spread that this leader of thought was not infected by the novel doctrine of the West. The genuine text leaves no doubt that he did receive the doctrine, but was not successful in bringing his fellow-churchmen to accept it. Elias perceived clearly how the doctrine suited the very beautiful Marian liturgy of the Greeks; yet bias against 'Latinisms' was too strong against his program. There is but one woman in the other three. Again, it is only between Mary and the devil that hostility is absolute and mutual. Thirdly, the semen of the devil is not sinning men or sinning angels, but sin, and there is no opposition to this semen which can be verified in the case of Eve; it is verified because of the opposition to the devil verified in Christ, and through Christ, in Mary alone. Father Pierce sums up his interpretation in the words: "I will raise an impenetrable barrier of Grace between you and in a New Woman, between your sin and Her Offspring, the New Man. He will defeat you completely, while you inflict upon Him a minor, physical hurt." MARY'S VOW OF VIRGINITY. Since the early part of the fourth century the testimonies of Saints Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory of Nyssa and others have prevailed in making the opinion common that Our Lady made a vow of perpetual virginity. The patristic argument was based on the exegesis of the narrative of the Annunciation, and especially on the words, "How shall this be done, because I know not man?"(Lk. 1, 34) In the eighth and ninth centuries the Greek Church celebrated the feast of the Presentation. According to the apocryphal accounts the parents of Our Lady presented her in the Temple at the age of three, and it was at this age that she pronounced her vow of virginity. The Latins took over the feast, and until the time of Sixtus V, the prayer of the Mass made specific mention of the age of three. It is commonly held now that the particular time of the pronouncing of the vow cannot be determined; most exegetes note that the Gospel narration shows that it was before the marriage of Mary and Joseph. The second argument for the fact of a vow is ex convenientia, and is found briefly and clearly in the Summa (3, qu. 28, a. 4) In the Roman law marriage was a social connection entered into and recognized by the civil power. It was not understood to be a bond, which had to originate in a free consent, and which was permanent and would perdure apart from the will of the parties.
In the view of the Roman law the two elements of marriage were the affectio maritalis and the vita communis; with the vanishing of the affectio maritalis, divorce became easy. The doctrine of the Church was opposed to this view and its consequences.
Father Herman does not agree that historically Justinian substituted the Christian for the Roman concept of marriage in the codification of the sixth century. But he does agree that the Emperor's tightening up of marriage laws is to be admitted, though on a very substantial point there is an ominous silence: there is not found in the Novelle a single word which declares that an illicit divorce is to be declared null and void; the law still provided for remarriage. It may be that the Emperor simply found it impossible to enforce the stricter demands of the Gospel in which personally he thoroughly believed; the difficulties of the times in this respect are amply proved in the writings of the Fathers.
It may not be amiss to point out that this history may throw some light on a question which is being mooted today. The recent emphasis in dealing with the ends of the sacrament upon the co-primary purpose of developing through the vita communis the personality of the partners is in contrast to the omission to develop this point in the early writers. May it not be that the emphasis of the Roman law on the affectio maritalis and vita communis and the possibility of divorce if the first became extinct, created a situation for the leaders of the time which accounts for their abstention from emphasizing these personal elements of the marriage state?
